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Abstract
Collective action clauses (CACs) are provisions specifying that a supermajority of
bondholders can change the terms of a bond. We study how CACs determine govern-
ments’ ﬁscal incentives, sovereign bond prices and default probabilities in environments
with and without contingent debt and IMF presence. We claim that CACs are likely to
be an irrelevant dimension of debt contracts in current sovereign debt markets because
of the variety of instruments utilized by sovereigns and the implicit IMF guarantee.
Nonetheless, under a new international bankruptcy regime like that recently proposed
by the IMF, CACs can increase signiﬁcantly the cost of borrowing for sovereigns, con-
trary to what is suggested in previous empirical literature.
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11 Introduction
Collective action clauses (CACs) are provisions in debt contracts specifying that the terms
of the contract regarding principal, interest, and maturity can change if there is consent of
a predetermined supermajority of bondholders. This paper studies how CACs determine
governments’ ﬁscal incentives, their cost of borrowing, and their default probabilities. Un-
derstanding these interactions is essential for the design of the so-called “Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism” (SDRM) proposed by the IMF and currently under discussion.1
When governments raise funds in international capital markets to ﬁnance their ﬁscal
deﬁcits, it is diﬃcult to observe or enforce the way in which these resources are spent.
Whether those funds are employed in ﬁnancing “unproductive” government expenditure
—from corruption to overspending in political campaigns— or in ﬁnancing “productive” ex-
penditure —such as ports, roads, public health, cut of distortionary taxes or law enforcement—
usually has an impact on the countries’ future productivity and hence on their chances of
b e i n ga b l et om e e tt h e i ro b l i g a t i o n s .
Furthermore, when governments ﬁn dt h e m s e l v e sw i t hh u g ed e b to v e r h a n g s ,t h e yf a c et h e
unavoidable trade-oﬀ of utilizing their poorer ﬁscal resources to either ﬁnance their greater
expenditure needs or attend debt payments. In these cases, generating ﬁscal surpluses to
meet debt obligations is not only a matter of feasibility but also one of incentives. This
f e a t u r ei sk e yf o rC A C st om a t t e r . 2
At that point, both bondholders and the country under consideration would potentially
beneﬁt from a debt renegotiation, either through a debt restructuring, partial forgiveness
or both. The reason why is simple. Huge debt overhangs give governments few incentives
to generate ﬁscal surpluses for repayment. Whether renegotiation will actually occur or,
1The discussion about policies regarding sovereign debt dates back at least to Adam Smith. See the
evolution of these ideas in Rogoﬀ and Zettelmeyer (2002).
2See Morris and Shin (2001) and Corsetti, Guimaraes and Roubini (2003) for an interesting catalytic
ﬁnance approach alternative to our (ex-post) incentive imperfection. See Haldane, Penalver, Saporta and
Shin (2003) for an asymmetric informational approach and Jeanne (2003) for a model where debt maturity
works as a commitment device.
2even if it did, whether the outcome of the renegotiation process will be the best possible
ex-post outcome for bondholders is a matter of them acting cooperatively, for which they
need to have aligned incentives. The best possible ex post outcome for bondholders is
one where the value of the outstanding debt after renegotiation is maximized. This value
depends on both the nominal amount of debt outstanding and the probability of repayment.
Because governments’ incentives to repay depend negatively on the size of their outstanding
debt, bondholders face the trade-oﬀ of forgiving part of that debt and hence increasing the
probability of repayment versus holding on to the old debt.
But bondholders’ incentives to renegotiate might not be aligned if lenders are large in
number, or if they have debt issued with diﬀerent characteristics regarding CACs and legal
jurisdictions.3 The argument works as follows: if each bondholder posseses a very small
fraction of the debt, he will have little incentive to forgive because he can only marginally
aﬀect the government’s incentives to repay. Since the probability of getting paid is basically
independent of an individual’s actions, he would always ﬁnd it incentive compatible to hold
to the pre-existing debt rather than cooperate in the renegotiation process. In the same
spirit, if the debt has been issued in diﬀerent legal jurisdictions, the absence of an interna-
tional bankruptcy court creates conﬂict among jurisdictions of creditors. In the end, this
free riding problem introduces a very costly renegotiation process (even under CACs). CACs
play an important role in that they reduce the cost of renegotiation by aligning bondholders’
incentives in case of ﬁnancial distress within a jurisdiction. For example, these clauses can
specify a majority rule that binds (or induces) all bondholders to a friendly restructuring
process, eliminating the free riding problem among creditors in a given country.4,5 Further-
more, CACs together with Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) would reduce
the free riding problem even further by aligning creditors’ incentives across jurisdictions.
We show that facilitating sovereign debt renegotiation, with CACs and a SDRM, is
3This is a characteristic of the 1990s that was not present in the 1980s, when syndications of banks held
most of the international bonds.
4See Dixon and Wall (2000) and Sturzenegger (2002) for descriptions of commonly used CACs.
5Keltzer (2002) analyses an interesting dynamic model of constant renegotiation under diﬀerent bond
characteristics.
3n o ta l w a y sag o o di d e af r o mt h ee x - a n t ep e r s p e c t i v ew h e nd e b tp a y m e n t sa r en o ts t a t e
contingent.6 At the moment of raising the resources to ﬁnance government expenditure, and
when there is moral hazard in government’s expenditures, a costly debt restructuring process
c a nb eu s e da sac o m m i t m e n td e v i c et on o tr e n e g o t i a t ei nc a s eo fﬁnancial distress. While
the absence of the CACs is ex-post ineﬃcient for the parties, they can introduce powerful
incentives for governments to behave ﬁscally. By reducing the government’s payoﬀ when
ﬁnancial distress occurs, debt issuance without CACs has the advantage of avoiding the
government’s ﬁscal misconduct.7
The sensitivity of the probability of crisis to government ﬁscal conduct determines whether
such clauses, together with a SDRM, would beneﬁt the issuing government. We show that
committing to not renegotiate, by avoiding these type of clauses in the debt contracts, can
be welfare enhancing when the chances of a crisis are sensitive to the government’s ﬁscal
conduct. If so, placing the debt under US law, generally without collective actions pro-
visions, or in various jurisdictions induces good incentives for governments to avoid debt
crisis altogether, since if default was to happen renegotiation would be very costly. On the
other hand, we also show that debt contracts with CACs and a SDRM that facilitates the
renegotiation dominate those without such clauses when the probability of ﬁnancial crisis
is mainly driven by exogenous reasons. In this case, collective action provisions, together
with an international bankruptcy court, are recommendable because reducing the cost of
renegotiation is not only optimal from the ex-post but also from the ex-ante perspective.
Matters are diﬀe r e n tw h e nt h ew o r l dh a st h eI M Fw i t h o u tc o m m i t m e n tt oa v o i di n t e r v e n -
tion. We assume that this institution represents the interest of a group of countries aﬀected
by the performance of emerging economies via contagion, geopolitical or trade considera-
tions. Then, governments’ decisions to include or not include friendly restructuring clauses
in bonds are inﬂuenced by IMF behavior, aﬀecting the international allocation of capital
and the countries’ incentives to stay out of trouble. While in the absence of the IMF coun-
tries would be inclined to avoid CACs and to not have a SDRM as a commitment device
6When debt payments are state contingent including these clauses is never a good idea.
7This trade oﬀ is in the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).
4for moral hazard considerations, in its presence they would prefer it in order to force an
IMF intervention and hence beneﬁt from subsidized international borrowing.8 In general, we
show by propositions and examples that the IMF can have ambiguous implications regarding
borrowing countries’ welfare, bond prices, and default probabilities.
Our analysis sheds light on the discussion of the role of collective actions clauses together
with a SDRM in aﬀecting the trade oﬀ between ex-post restructuring cost and ex-ante
moral hazard. Recent work by Eichengreen and Mody (2000) shows that yields on primary
sovereign debt markets (initial auctions) are higher when bonds have CACs, especially for
low rated borrowers.9 Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2003) and Gugiatti and Richards
(2003) argue that bond prices are not aﬀected very much by the implicit (legal jurisdiction)
or explicit inclusion of this type of clauses when looking at yields in secondary markets.
Hence, they conjecture, either ﬁnancial markets are not really aware of the role of those
clauses, or the moral hazard problem that these clauses bring to international credit markets
does not outweigh the ex-post ineﬃciencies (of no renegotiation) and switching to a SDRM
would not increase borrowing costs.10 We show that these empirical exercises suﬀer from
some sort of Lucas critique. The reason is that bond yields are estimated under the current
regime, characterized by no renegotiation due to a compositional eﬀect and the presence of
the IMF, but these yields would be diﬀerent in a regime with a SDRM and CACs.
First, our analysis shows that the probability of a country falling into default is aﬀected
by the composition of total international borrowing, and not by the fact that it has issued
few bonds with CACs. In this respect, three qualiﬁcations must be considered: i) the
composition of debt with and without collective action provisions, ii) the number of legal
jurisdictions where the debt was issued, and to a lesser extent, iii) the diversity of the debt
8Ghosal and Miller (2003) evaluate collective action clauses against a SDRM with an international bank-
ruptcy court. They favor the latter given that this court is assumed to have veriﬁability, commitment and
enforceability power (all of which are assumed away in our discussion). Eaton (2002) also assumes that an
international bankruptcy court can distinguish why things went bad (veriﬁability).
9Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2003) conﬁrm these ﬁndings utilizing data on secondary debt markets.
10Similar arguments are presented in Haldane, Penalver, Saporta and Shin (2003) and Dixon and Wall
(2000).
5maturity structure (although we do not formally analyze this case). Quantitatively, these
compositional eﬀects are relevant. By 2002, 59% oﬀ all international borrowing occurred
under US jurisdiction, 10% under German jurisdiction and 6% under Japanese law, all with
no collective action provisions, while 24% resided in the UK, where the opposite is true.11 The
compositional eﬀect is likely to be driving the result that borrowing costs are similar in both
cases, given that most of the international debt is issued without collective action provisions
(and no SDRM is in place). Once the country is in ﬁnancial distress, holders of bonds with
friendly restructuring provisions might not forgive because they posses a minority of the
total outstanding debt and they can only marginally aﬀect the probability of repayment. In
particular, we argue that the compositional eﬀect was present in the case of Argentina, and
likely to have been present in other cases of default.
Second, the presence of the IMF also helps explain the negligible yield diﬀerential in
bonds. Even if forgiveness was to occur under a speciﬁc composition of debt and in the
absence of the IMF, which would generate a premium in bond yields, the premium is likely
to disappear when lenders anticipate an IMF intervention. The country would then count
on having enough resources to repay all bonds regardless of the debt composition in terms
of the number of jurisdictions and collective action provisions, and hence yield diﬀerentials
would vanish. Furthermore, the IMF intervention is more likely to occur when lenders do not
forgive (either when there are no CACs or when there is no forgiveness by lenders because
of the compositional eﬀect).
Looking at these yield premiums in search of evidence of moral hazard in the presence of
the IMF is not a good idea. To see this, consider the case in which all countries have all of
their debt issue with one type of contractual arrangement in a unique jurisdiction, abstracting
from our ﬁrst consideration about the compositional eﬀect. In this world, bonds with no
collective action provisions would exhibit lower yields because bailouts will be more likely,
and not because of better incentives. Contrary to common wisdom, bonds without CACs can
induce serious moral hazard problems if the IMF cannot commit to avoid intervention. In
11See Geithner, Gianviti and Hausler (2002) for the composition of international borrowing. See Gianviti
(2002) for diﬀerences in main national laws (English, US, German and Japanese laws).
6such a world, crisis will be frequent for countries issuing debt without collective provisions,
although prices would not reﬂect the risk since lenders will recoup their loans either from
the country (in good times) or the IMF (in bad times).
Whether CACs can mitigate moral hazard depends on how much the international com-
munity cares about a particular country. We characterized three main cases: the IMF can
have a low, an intermediate or a high level of interest in the destiny of the country. In the
ﬁrst case, the IMF would not intervene regardless of the actions of the government. Then
there is no point of forcing countries to include CACs and the free contractual approach is
actually constrained optimal. In fact, forcing the inclusion of friendly restructuring provi-
sions can increase the probability of default for usual moral hazard considerations. In the
intermediate case, the IMF has enough interest in the country to launch a bailout, although
investors would forgive or renegotiate under collective actions and a SDRM. By forcing coun-
tries to include these provisions, the IMF would beneﬁt to the detriment of the borrower’s
welfare, given that investors would price the default risk. An interesting theoretical possibil-
ity arises in this case: “CACs might induce better incentives,” contrary to what is suggested
in policy discussions. There exists a range in the parameter space where the IMF would
launch a full bailout under no collective actions but would not intervene under CACs. Since
debt forgiveness is never as big as a full bailout, countries would exert more eﬀort under
CACs. Finally, in the case where the IMF has a high level of interest in the country, the
IMF will implement full bailouts. This follows from a result stating that when the country
is ﬁnancially distressed there is always some debt forgiveness, either from the IMF or from
lenders, but never from all. Consequently, again we obtain that there will be no diﬀerence
between yields across bonds, although crises (bailouts) will be frequent if the moral hazard
problem is important.
2 The Model
We describe the model with the help of Figure 1. This is a two period world. The world
begins with a country issuing an amount D of debt in period one. The resources raised are
7allocated into two types of government expenditures: “productive” (G1) and “unproductive”
(G2).12 Unproductive government expenditure gives the country’s government a total utility
of kG2,w i t hk>0. The interest rate is zero, without loss of generality. In the second
period the ﬁrst source of uncertainty is realized. It is known whether the country enters
as i t u a t i o nw h e r ei tn e e d saﬁnancial restructuring, or if it simply does well. When the
country performs well it reaches an output level Yh and pays an amount Dh.A tt h a ts t a g e ,
the government’s payoﬀ becomes Yh − Dh + kG2, which occurs with probability θ(G1).W e
assume that θ




00 < 0. Thus the role of the productive
government expenditure is to increase the probability of the country avoiding the conﬂict
with bond holders and producing a high level of output.
Figure 1:
With probability 1 − θ(G1) the country falls into a state of ﬁnancial distress in which
chances of meeting debt obligations are at risk. At this stage, the government decides how
much ﬁscal eﬀort e to exert. Higher ﬁscal eﬀort increases the probability of reaching the
second state of the world, where the country produces Yl.W ea s s u m et h a tYh >Y l > 0.T h e
ﬁscal eﬀort is assumed to be increasingly costly to capture the idea that raising additional
12This resembles the investement-consumption decision in Atkeson (1991).
8resources when the country is ﬁnancially distressed is more expensive than in good times.
In particular, we assume that the ﬁscal eﬀo r tc o s tf u n c t i o ni sg(e) with g0 > 0, g00 > 0,a n d
lim
e−→∞ g0(e)=∞. Also, this cost is paid in advance before the realization of the uncertainty.
Thus the government’s payoﬀ at the second stage is Yl −Dl −g(e)+kG2, assumed to occur
with probability e. With probability 1−e the country is unable to produce and hence repay
any debt. Then, the government’s payoﬀ simply becomes kG2 − g(e).
The three states of the world are observable for the parties. For this reason, an aggregate
debt contract is a triple {D,Dh,D l} because we only need to specify debt payments in those
states where there is some output to be shared by the parties. We say this is the “aggregate”
debt contract because in Section 4 we study the role of the composition of sovereign debt.
Finally, our economy is supposed to face a mass of inﬁnitesimal risk neutral competitive
international lenders.
For simplicity we also assume:
Assumption 1: g(e)= 1
1+χe1+χYl,w i t hχ > 0.
Where Yl is used for normalization purposes. More importantly, we also assume
Assumption 2: G1, G2,a n de are unobservable to lenders.
For future reference, we use the following deﬁnition
Deﬁnition 1 A debt contract dominates another one when it derives higher or equal govern-
ment utility on the parameter set while it derives strictly greater utility for some non-empty
parameter subset.
Now we concentrate on solving allocations under diﬀerent environments.
3 State contingent debt payments and no CACs
Because of Assumption 2, ﬁnancial contracts cannot depend on G1, G2,o re.A sw ek n o w ,
these variables aﬀect the probability of debt repayment. This imperfection introduces a
moral hazard problem when G1 and G2 a r ec h o s e ni nt h eﬁrst period and when the ﬁscal





EU = θ(G1)[Yh − Dh]+[ 1− θ(G1)]
·







θ(G1)Dh +[ 1− θ(G1)]eDl ≥ D (2)












Equation (2) is the lenders’ participation constraint. Lenders’ expected proﬁts should
be at least zero. Equation (3) is the government’s resource constraint. Equation (4) is the
incentive compatibility constraint for the government in period two, when conﬂict arises.
This constraint holds with equality because Dl is less than or equal to Yl.A tt h a ts t a g e ,t h e
debt contract is irreversible and all variables except the level of ﬁscal eﬀort are given. The
optimal allocation for Problem I is subject to the constraint that the ﬁscal eﬀort choice is
driven by incentives because of Assumption 2. Equation (5) is the incentive compatibility
constraint for the government in the ﬁrst period, when it chooses to allocate its resources
between productive and unproductive uses. Again, the incentive compatibility constraint is
imposed because the government cannot commit in advance to a pre-speciﬁed government
expenditure plan.







where eﬀort e ∈ [0,1]. The chances of the government of being able to pay back at least part
o ft h ed e b ta r ed r i v e nb yDl itself. In the case of no debt, the ﬁscal eﬀort exerted is e =1
and the country never reaches the no-output state. A huge debt overhang goes against the
ﬁscal incentives to meet debt payments as eﬀort decreases with Dl.T h i sp o i n tt u r n so u tt o
be very important in our story. In particular, if Yl = Dl,t h e ne =0 .
10Replacing the eﬀort level in our problem, letting G2 = D −G1, and elimiting a constant































A closed form solution for this problem does not exist.
Problem I implicitly assumes that the contract cannot be revised or renegotiated in the
second period. This is assumed to be the case when bonds do not include CACs.13 When
they do, bondholders can potentially reach a restructuring agreement that would beneﬁt
both sides, creditors and the debtor country.
4 Renegotiation
To see how this works, imagine that the government has reached a state of conﬂict with
lenders in the second period. For generality, also assume that at this stage part of the debt
is symmetrically distributed in n legal jurisdictions that implicitly or explicitly include collec-
tive action provisions in bonds, while the rest of this debt is issued with no special provisions.
Jurisdictions can enforce the outcome of the renegotiation process to all bondholders in their
own countries, but they are unable to do so in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, assume all
jurisdictions renegotiate at the same time.
Do lenders have incentive to renegotiate in this case? The answer depends on the compo-
sition of the debt. Lenders might be better oﬀ by relieving part of the debt overhang to this
13De Brun and Della Mea (2003) show that the free rider problem in renegotiations without CACs is
overestimated, as in the recent case of Uruguay 2003. Nonetheless, our results are relevant as long as CACs
can make the renegotiation process easier to implement.
11country and thus inducing the government to increase its probability of repayment when a
large enough mass of bonds is renegotiated.
When renegotiation is allowed, the debt after renegotiation would be the one that maxi-
mizes the value of the debt for each jurisdiction given the actions of the rest of the jurisdic-























li denotes the payment to jurisdiction i after the renegotiation, DC
l−i are the payments
to the rest of the jurisdictions with collective action provisions, DNC
l are the payments to
bondholders without friendly restructuring clauses, and DC
l are the total payments promised
to all jurisdictions with CACs on issuance. Superscript C and NC stand for collective
and no collective action clauses. Equations (11) and (12) are the government’s incentive
compatibility constraint and participation constraint, respectively. Combining the ﬁrst order
































As long as an interior solution exists (Equation (12) is not binding), there will be renegoti-
ation. Notice that the total amount of renegotiated debt by jurisdiction decreases with the
number of jurisdictions and the amount of debt issued without collective action provisions.
This implies that as the free riding problem worsens, each jurisdiction will tend to forgive
12more. Nonetheless, Equation (14) shows that the total debt after renegotiation increases
in n and DNC
l . Also, Equation (15) demonstrates that total forgiveness and eﬀort decrease
with the number of jurisdictions and the amount of debt issued without collective clauses.
Hence, the conditional probability of default given that the country is in ﬁnancial distress
increases with these two compositional eﬀect.












This expression shows that compositional eﬀects in sovereign debt are important as a commit-
ment device to not renegotiate. Renegotiation is more unlikely to occur as the composition
of debt without CACs increases (DC
l falls) and as the number of jurisdictions increases. This
compositional eﬀect is consistent with empirical ﬁndings by Eichengreen and Mody (2000)
where bond prices with collective action provisions are only slightly higher than those without
such clauses, and further evidence by Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2001), and Gugiatti
and Richards (2003) where bond prices are not really diﬀerent whether they include or do
not include collective action provisions. It is likely that because of the compositional eﬀect
we just described, bond prices would not diﬀer given that there is no preferential treatment
to any bondholder. Conjecturing from this result that the beneﬁts of not having collective
action provisions to avoid moral hazard problems are not that great (as proposed in the
empirical discussion) is simply wrong under this environment. Furthermore, this evidence
cannot be used to support the idea of a massive inclusion of these clauses in bond contracts
together with an international bankruptcy court.
The main problem is that conjectures are drawn from observed bond prices under the
current regime, where the free riding problem across bondholders is important enough that,
even under CACs, no forgiveness would take place. Collective action provisions would not
be used in the renegotiation process, as was the case in the Pakistan default and likely to
be the case of Argentina 2001, yet unresolved. But matters might eventually be diﬀerent if
countries are forced to gradually swap their debt to include restructuring provisions, and if
an international bankruptcy court (SDRM) is born. Then the moral hazard problem might
13become important, and sovereigns might face higher borrowing rates. In other words, the
conjectures drawn from current bond prices suﬀer from some sort of the Lucas critique, in
the sense that bond prices will be diﬀerent if a SDRM together with CACs are put in place.
In order to analyze the implications of a SDRM, we focus on two main cases: one where
all bonds include CACs and there is no issue about jurisdictions (due to the presence of a
SDRM) and one where none does. In the ﬁrst case, we assume bondholders cooperate in the
renegotiation process and act as one big lender. In the second case, the opposite is true and
free riding makes renegotiation impossible.
For future reference, we deﬁne the allocations as outcomes of the renegotiation process
when all bonds have CACs (DNC
l =0 ) and the number of jurisdictions does not aﬀect the












as long as D∗
l <D l.
Overall, our analysis suggests that optimal allocations under CACs must be diﬀerent
than those coming from solving Problem I due to the renegotiation. For this reason we
now turn to study those allocations.
5 State contingent debt payments, CACs and a SDRM
Lenders must take into account the fact that, if the country reaches the state of conﬂict,
renegotiation will occur as long as D∗
l <D l. Moreover, those incentives to forgive an impor-
tant fraction of the debt are determined by χ, a parameter that determines the sensitivity
o ft h eg o v e r n m e n tt oe x e r tﬁscal eﬀort in troubled times. Equation (17) shows that D∗
l
decreases with this parameter and it goes to zero when χ −→ 0, illustrating that incentives
to renegotiate can be powerful.










1/χ − kG1 (19)
subject to























l is given by the renegotiation problem presented above (Equation (17)).
Proposition 2 With state contingent debt payments, debt contracts without CACs dominate
those with CACs.
Proof. Problem II diﬀers from Problem I in that it allows for debt renegotiation. Both
problems maximize the same objective function, while the feasible set of Problem II is strictly
included in the feasible set of Problem I due to Equation (22).
Again, with collective action provisions it is not credible to set Dl >D ∗
l since it is known
that in case of ﬁnancial distress the debt will be renegotiated. Hence the lack of commitment
to not renegotiate adds a constraint to our optimization problem with state contingent debt.
6 Uncontingent debt payments and no CACs
In this case, creditors’ rights are assumed to be the same in all states, although default is
possible. Furthermore, governments pay what is owed as long as they have enough resources.










1/χ − kG1 (23)
15subject to



















min{Dh,Y l} = Dl (26)
w h e r eE q u a t i o n( 2 6 )i m p o s e st h ec o n s t r a i n tt h a td e b ti sn o ts t a t ec o n t i n g e n t .T h i sg i v e st h e
following result:
Proposition 3 Without CACs, debt contracts with state contingent payments dominate con-
tracts without state contingent payments.
Proof. The argument here is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. Optimal allocations in
Problem I derive at least the utility derived by allocations in Problem III.
Finally, we study our last environment without the IMF.
7 Uncontingent debt payments, CACs and a SDRM
Again, payments are uncontingent in this case, subject to the feasibility constraint. Opti-


































l } = Dl (30)
Because CACs impose an additional constraint due to the fact that D∗
l <Y l from Equa-
tion (17), two statements result:
16Proposition 4 With CACs, state contingent debt contracts dominate uncontingent ones.
Proof. The feasible set of Problem IV is included in the feasible set of Problem II.I f
Dl = D∗
l in Problem II, then state contingent debt contracts derive the same utility as
uncontingent ones.
Proposition 5 With uncontingent debt payments, there exist economies where debt con-
tracts with no CACs dominate those with such clauses and vice versa.
Proof. Because the intuition behind the proofs is important for our discussion, we develop
the proof to this proposition here.
We prove our proposition by example. For this, we make some simplifying assumptions.
The ﬁrst is
θ(G1)=
½ ¯ θ G1 > G1
θ otherwise
(31)
When the productive government expenditure is large enough, the country reaches a
higher probability of success (¯ θ > θ). Notice that the distance
¯ ¯¯ θ − θ
¯ ¯ suggests a higher
sensitivity of ﬁnal outcomes to the government expenditure G1 and it makes incentive issues
more relevant in our discussion.
Another assumption is that Yl <D . Hence, as we noted from the international investors’
participation constraint (Equation (28)), Dh >Y l.
Now assume that the debt contract does not include CACs. Because there is no rene-
gotiation in this case, the equilibrium level of ﬁscal eﬀo r te x e r t e db yt h ec o u n t r yi nc a s eo f
ﬁnancial distress is simply e∗ =0 ,g i v e nt h a tDh >Y l. Countries will have no incentive to
exert ﬁscal eﬀort because everything produced would go to meet debt payments. As a result,
the country would not exert any level of eﬀort to repay. From Equation (28), we see that
Dh satisﬁes ¯ θDh = D.
Our incentive constraint to support a high level of productive government expenditure,
under our assumption about θ(G1),i st h e n
¡¯ θ − θ
¢
(Yh − Dh) ≥ kG1 (32)
which we assume holds.
17Hence, the expected payoﬀ for a country issuing debt without CACs is
EU = ¯ θYh − D − kG1 (33)
Under CACs, countries and debt holders will renegotiate if the country reaches the state
of ﬁnancial distress. Then, debt payments are given by D∗
l . That problem with collective
actions clauses is otherwise equal to the previous one. But it is useful to inspect the incentive
compatibility constraint for this case.
Because renegotiation is possible, the state of the world where the country faces ﬁnancial
distress is not that bad, and hence distorts the country’s incentives to allocate the funds in
productive expenditure. The incentive compatibility constraint for a high level of G1 is
¡¯ θ − θ
¢
"












is big enough to overturn Condition (32). Consequently, the
incentive compatibility constraint for ¯ θ does not hold and θ = θ. Furthermore, G1 =0 .
Since Dl = D∗
l the investors’ participation constraint becomes






1/χ ≥ D (35)
Using Expression (17) and plugging this constraint into the objective function, we obtain
the country’s expected payoﬀ under collective actions clauses
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Yh − kG1 (37)
Intuitively, the result depends on the sensitivity of the probability θ to productive govern-
ment expenditure. If this probability is unaﬀected by G1, then the optimal contract should
include CACs and renegotiation takes place. Note that when
¯ ¯¯ θ − θ
¯ ¯ −→ 0 our condition
will not hold, making debt contracts with CACs optimal. Why? Reducing the cost of the
contract ex-post (making renegotiation easy to implement) is optimal ex-ante.
18Matters are diﬀerent when this sensitivity is strong. Making the state of distress very
bad (although ex-post ineﬃcient) will provide greater incentives for countries to stay out of
trouble and induce ﬁscal behavior. This is the case when, other things equal,
¯ ¯¯ θ − θ
¯ ¯ is big
enough.14
Figure 2 summarizes our results regarding the welfare implications of the diﬀerent con-
tractual arrangements (where > implies dominance according to Deﬁnition 1).
Figure 2: Welfare under diﬀerent debt contracts
Two main messages follow from this ﬁgure. First, CACs and the SDRM can only im-
prove welfare in a world without state contingent contracts. This implies that maybe more
attention should be focused on how to implement state contingent contracts rather than on
the SDRM. Indeed, GDP growth indexed bonds have been proposed before. Second, our
result implies that in an environment without the IMF, countries should be allowed to choose
t h et y p eo fd e b tc o n t r a c tt h a tb e s tﬁts their needs. In this sense, a SDRM together with
collective action provisions is welfare detrimental for those economies where incentive issues
regarding ﬁscal conduct are central (G1 tends to be low relative to G2).
Furthermore, note that in a world with state contingent bonds, CACs would not be
utilized since they would reduce welfare.
We can also learn from the example provided in the previous proof what is the impact of
collective actions on the price of the debt. In the absence of collective actions, or even with
14We work under the assumption that θ > 0. Otherwise loans D could not be supported in equilibrium.
19collective actions and enough free riding among lenders (as shown in Section 4), we know that
θDNC
h = D because no ﬁscal eﬀort is exerted by a country that falls into ﬁnancial distress.
With CACs, the debt promise (Dh) is computed from Equation (35). Rearranging this
expression, together with the government’s incentive compatibility constraint and assuming
that Condition (34) does not hold, we obtain
θD
C
h +( 1− θ)e
∗D
∗
l = D (38)
where DC
h i st h eu n c o n t i n g e n td e b tp r o m i s e . F o rt h es a m ea m o u n to fl o a n sD,C A C sw i l l
reduce the cost of the debt whenever DC
h <D NC
h and vice versa. We now focus on this

















l <D (θ − θ) (40)
Note that because e∗D∗
l <D C
h and from Equation (38) we obtain that e∗D∗
l <Dand
hence θ(1 − θ)e∗D∗
l <D . Consequently, a higher sensitivity of the probability of good times
(a higher
¯ ¯¯ θ − θ
¯ ¯) makes debt without CACs cheaper in the sense of lower payments DC
h .I n






<D (θ − θ). (41)
On the contrary, when the sensitivity of the probability of a good outcome with respect
to the government’s action is low (
¯ ¯¯ θ − θ
¯ ¯ −→ 0), condition (40) is overturned and debt
contracts with CACs are cheaper. Renegotiation reduces the cost of the contract ex-post
without altering incentives ex-ante. Interestingly, the price of the debt being lower for
contracts without CACs does not imply that the country will choose to utilize them because
of Condition (37). As an example, if the opportunity cost of unproductive government
expenditure is too big (k), then the government might prefer to not include CACs, even
though they would be eﬀective in imposing ﬁscal discipline.
20O u rn e x ts t e pi st os t u d yt h er o l ep l a y e db yt h eI M Fi na ﬀecting the government’s
expenditure decisions. Understanding the IMF’s role in international ﬁnancial markets turns
out to be essential for our discussion, because it distorts the international allocation of capital
by changing equilibrium prices.
8T h e r o l e o f t h e I M F
In the former sections we analyze an environment in the absence of the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF). In these sections we extend the analysis to study the role of the IMF in
international ﬁnancial markets because, as it turns out, it is a key player in the Sovereign
Debt Restructuring analysis.15 While previous studies such as Miller and Zhang (2000) have
discussed the role of the IMF in the Sovereign Debt Restructuring analysis, ours departs from
that literature in that we choose to model the IMF as a strategic player making decisions
to maximize its own payoﬀs, rather than having the IMF committed to a pre-determined
strategy.
We let the IMF be an institution responsible for representing a club of countries in taking
actions, such as bailing out countries, in reaction to international ﬁnancial crisis. In essence,
we assume that when a country defaults on its debt, it generates externalities to other
countries in the world, in one way or another. Financial contagion is one example of these
externalities, but there are other reasons why member countries might have interests in the
destiny of a particular country. Geopolitical reasons, or economic reasons such as having
a trading partner’s economy under-performing might call for IMF intervention. We model
these reasons as a cost J that the international community incurs when an emerging country
reaches the state of default (the no-output-state in our story). The IMF has the power to
grant subsidized loans to countries in ﬁnancial distress. In our model, the size of the subsidy
or bailout is S, and the purpose is to reduce the debt overhang and introduce incentives for
countries to avoid a state of default and ﬁnancial contagion. We describe the sequence of
15In previous studies, the IMF has been modeled as an auditor, an enforcer, or a fund. See Powell (2002).
In this paper, the IMF plays the role of a fund because it can provide money in case of ﬁnancial distress.
21the model with the help of Figure 3.
Figure 3
When the ﬁrst uncertainty is resolved with a bad shock, the IMF has the possibility of
bailing out part or all of the outstanding debt. A bailout will aﬀect the country’s payoﬀs
and hence its incentives to exert ﬁscal eﬀort. In our simple story, we model the bailout
as a gift from the IMF to the country and international investors. While IMF loans are
subsidized, these loans are rarely defaulted on. Nonetheless, this assumption captures two
important ideas: 1) IMF interventions are subsidies to the recipient country, and 2) IMF
re-ﬁnancing removes the problem from the current government, which we assume only cares
about the near future. For both reasons, we model the IMF bailouts as gifts without loss of
generality.16
For practical purposes, we study the role of the IMF in the environment where interna-
tional debt obligations are not state contingent.17 That is, the ﬁnancial contracts pre-specify
an amount that is promised to be delivered in all states of the world. Despite the fact that
promises are uncontingent, debt payments might be subject to renegotiation or default.
We ﬁrst study the case where debt contracts do not include CACs in order to then move
to the alternative with CACs.
16An alternative way of modeling this is by lettting the IMF recover part of the bailout in the future
regardless of the state of the world the country falls in. This alternative of reducing the cost of the bailout
for the IMF is equivalent to an increase in J, working in favor of more frequent IMF’s interventions.
17We also rule out the possibility that the IMF could reward countries that reach the high output state.
228.1 Uncontingent debt payments and no CACs
The game is solved using backward induction. Once the ﬁrst shock is realized as bad, the
IMF decides the size of the bailout, knowing that there will be no renegotiation between
bondholders and the government because there is enough free riding among creditors. At
this point, the IMF is aware of the incentive eﬀe c t si tg e n e r a t e sw i t hi t sb a i l o u t ,a sw e l la s
the fact that its actions change the probability of default and ﬁnancial contagion (no output











∗ − Dl = e
∗χ
IMFYl (43)
Dl =m i n {Dh,Y l + S
∗} (44)
0 ≤ S
∗ ≤ Dh (45)
where Equation (43) is the government’s incentive compatibility. Condition (44) states that
the debt is uncontingent. Note that the total amount of resources available in the second
state is now Yl + S∗. Condition (45) implies that bailouts never exceed Dh,o re q u i v a l e n t l y
that e ≤ 1. The solution for the IMF’s problem is
S















as long as an interior solution to the problem exists. This is the case when χ > 1 and
0 ≤ Sint ≤ Dh.W h e nSint < 0, the optimal solution for the IMF bailout is S∗ =0 ,w h i c h





. Thus, when the debt overhang is not big
enough or the externality of default on the international community is not big enough, we
ﬁnd that the IMF best response is to stay out. Equivalently, when Sint >D h the IMF will
implement a full bailout and drive the eﬀort to e∗ =1 .
23In the case of χ < 1, there is always a corner solution with full or no bailout depending
on the IMF’s payoﬀs.18 There is full bailout when the following inequality holds and vice
versa
U








IMF (S =0 )
Note that when there is full bailout, Dl = Dh, and because e =1 , Dh = D.T h i s
result shows that, when a full bailout is anticipated, no risk premium will be added to bonds
(without CACs). When there is no bailout, the ﬁscal eﬀort exerted is less than one and







J>D for Yl ≥ Dh,o r ( 4 8 )
J>D otherwise. (49)
A full bailout arises if its cost (D) is smaller than the expected beneﬁts ((1 − e)J), or in
other words, if the IMF cares enough about the destiny of the country (J is big enough).
In short, independently of the parameter χ being greater or less than one, we get that














depending on the case described by the above conditions.





EU = θ(G1)[Yh − Dh]+[ 1− θ(G1)]
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Dl =m i n {Dh,Y l + S
∗} (54)














Thus, in case of ﬁnancial distress, lenders receive at least S∗ no matter what the outcome
at this stage. When the bailout is not full, lenders will get an additional Dh − S∗ when the
government manages to pull the country out of default and meet debt payments. This event





. Several observations follow from
this problem.
First, note that the incentive compatibility constraint for G1 implies that, for the same
debt contract (D,Dh,D h), the productive government expenditure falls with the size of the
bailout. In that sense, episodes of ﬁnancial distress are more frequent if the IMF intervenes.
Also notice that Problem V nests Problem III when there is no intervention (S∗ =0 ).
This occurs when the size of the externalities on the international community J is small






We obtain that whenever the IMF intervenes (S∗ > 0), then Dl = Dh, even if bailouts
are partial. We see this with the help of Figure 4, where we plot both functions Dl = Dh
and Dl = Yl +S∗ o nt h ev e r t i c a la x i sa n dt h es i z eo ft h eI M Fi n t e r v e n t i o no nt h eh o r i z o n t a l
axis, assuming Dh >Y l. The function Dl =m i n {Dh,Y l + S∗} passes through points A, B
and C. For any level of intervention corresponding to the segment AB, the IMF is bailing
out lenders without aﬀecting the probability of default (as it is shown in Equation (43)).
Hence, if intervention does occur in equilibrium, it will happen in the remaining section of
the min function where Dl = Dh.19 Moreover, bailouts never exceed the promised Dh since
at S∗ = Dh the ﬁscal eﬀo r ti sa ti t sm a x i m u m( e =1 ). On the other hand, note that if
19Interventions in the segment ABC imply partial bailout since (S∗ <D l), although partial interventions
in the segment BC support Dl = Dh.N o t et h a ta tp o i n tC (45 degree line), there is full bailout.
25Dh <Y l then segment AB disappears and Dl = Dh. We conclude that if the IMF intervenes
(S∗ > 0) equilibrium will happen in segment BC (Dh − Yl ≤ S∗ ≤ Dh).
Figure 4
Under partial bailouts, Dl = Dh and the size of the IMF’s bailout and the government’s
ﬁscal eﬀort are given by Expressions (46) and (47). Replacing these expressions in the
lenders’ participation constraint gives
Dh = D +( 1− θ)(1 − e
int)[Dh − S
∗] (56)
The risk premium under partial bailout is determined by the unconditional probability
of default and the amount lost by lenders in that state (Dh − S∗). When a full bailout is
anticipated (S∗ = Dh), then Dh = D implies that no risk premium will be added to bond
prices. Furthermore, full bailout implies that e =1 , abolishing the default state altogether.
From this intuition we get the following statement:
Proposition 6 Under uncontingent debt contracts and without CACs, the government’s
welfare under full bailout is greater than under partial and no bailout.
26Proof. See Appendix.
The heart of the proof of this proposition relies on the fact that the incentive compatibility
constraint for G1 is not binding when there is a full bailout (S∗ = Dl = Dh = D). The
intuition is that moral hazard is a problem for the government because lenders charge them
a higher premium. But premiums disappear under a full bailout because of the implicit IMF
guarantee. While full or no bailout are the only possible outcomes when χ < 1,w h e nχ > 1
partial bailout must be considered. Then
Proposition 7 The government’s welfare under partial bailout might be greater or smaller
than under no bailout.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of this proposition is similar to that of Proposition 5. The sensitivity of
productive government expenditure to bailouts can be so strong that countries would prefer
that the IMF did not exist.
Now we turn to the analysis of the case where bonds include CACs and there is a SDRM
in place. Because CACs facilitate renegotiation, the debt forgiveness can come from the
IMF’s bailout and/or a renegotiation with lenders. Here, we model the IMF and the lenders
in a game where they choose the amount of debt the IMF bails out and that lenders forgive.
In particular, we analyze a sequential (Stackelberg) game where the IMF is the leader in
the debt restructuring process.20 We consider the sequential (versus the simultaneous) game
more realistic, given that the IMF is wired to deal with countries in ﬁnancial distress and
hence has a ﬁrst mover advantage.
8.2 Stackelberg equilibrium with uncontingent debt payments,
CACs and a SDRM
Again, we solve the problem by backward induction and start analyzing the behavior of the
lender for a given size of the IMF’s bailout, under CACs and a SDRM.
20In an Appendix, available upon request, we analyze a simultaneous Cournot game. Multiplicity of
equilibria in pure and mixed strategies might arise in this case.
27The lenders’ forgiveness comes from their utility maximization problem. Lenders get





l when the country reaches the intermediate output level state,
occurring with probability eSt. Superscript St stands for Stackelberg. Note that while the
debt is uncontingent, actual payments are subject to renegotiation, and hence DSt
l is an








































where lenders renegotiate under a SDRM (no free riding). Note that the level of eﬀort
is independent of SSt, the IMF bailout. It is, in fact, the same level of eﬀo r tt h a tt h e
lender would exert under no bailout (see Equation (18)). Also note that DSt
l increases one-
to-one with SSt. Indeed, the lenders’ debt forgiveness plus the IMF’s bailout is constant
in that range, and hence the remaining debt is the same as under no IMF intervention
(DSt
l − SSt = D∗
l =
χ
1+χYl). Strictly speaking, the lenders’ best response to an IMF bailout





1+χYl + SSt when
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When lenders forgive some of their capital, the IMF best response is to avoid wasting
resources in a bailout. In this case, a bailout does not change the ﬁscal eﬀort exerted
28by the government, and hence the likelihood of avoiding the international ﬁnancial con-







> 1/(1 + χ)
1/χ, which implies that the bailout SSt is bigger than the
lenders’ forgiveness DSt
l − D∗
l without IMF intervention. Given the lenders’ best response




proves the following proposition21
Proposition 8 Under uncontingent debt contracts with CACs and a SDRM, there is always
some debt forgiveness either from the IMF or from lenders, but never from all of them in the
sequential game.




(same as under Problem II). The IMF is only intervening when the size of its bailout is
higher than the lenders’ forgiveness. There are cases where, even if the IMF’s targeted ﬁscal
eﬀort is higher than eSt in Equation (61), it would prefer not to launch a bailout. For low
levels of interventions there is not responsiveness of ﬁscal eﬀort to a greater size of the bailout,
neutralized by a smaller private debt forgiveness. Consequently, the IMF internalizes the
lenders’ response by not granting a bailout unless the IMF optimally opts to induce a higher
ﬁscal eﬀort than that of Expression (61) —due to a big enough J.
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21See that, in this case, the overall level of forgiveness to the government is greater, since DSt







> 0 (J is big enough) there is always some bailout, partial or full. Again





> 0 implies full bailout.
Furthermore,
Proposition 9 Under uncontingent debt contracts with CACs and a SDRM, the govern-
ment’s welfare under full bailout is greater than under no or partial bailout in the sequential
game. Moreover the government’s welfare under partial bailout might be greater or smaller
than under no bailout.
Proof. The proof follows from those to Propositions 6 and 7.
When χ > 1, partial bailout might arise. See that now H
¡
SSt¢
= −SSt + J(eSt − e∗),
which is greater than zero for a big enough externality J since eSt >e ∗ =1 /(1 + χ)
1/χ.
In summary, forgiveness comes either entirely from the IMF or from the lenders but never
from both —as Proposition 8 states. Then, if bailouts (partial or full) are equilibrium IMF
responses in the sequential game, allocations will necessarily coincide with those of Problem
V( uncontingent debt payments, no collective action provisions and IMF). Also, if the IMF
response is no bailout, allocations would coincide with those of Problem IV (uncontingent
debt payments, collective actions clauses and a SDRM without IMF).
Before concluding, we show that the IMF intervention is more likely to occur under debt
contracts without CACs.
Proposition 10 The parameter set for which there is IMF intervention is larger without
CACs.
This proposition follows from the following argument. We know from Proposition 8 that
when there are CACs there is never forgiveness from both the IMF and the lenders. This
implies that when there are CACs and the equilibrium is such that the IMF intervenes
anyway, the IMF would be indiﬀerent between having a SDRM in place or not. However,
when there is no IMF intervention (S =0 ), the IMF’s payoﬀ is higher under CACs and a
SDRM, since there is some forgiveness by the lenders and hence the ﬁscal eﬀort exerted by
the government (e) is higher. Therefore, whenever there is intervention under CACs and a
30SDRM, there is also intervention under no CACs, while the converse is false. This argument
resembles some of the reasons behind the IMF position in favor of a SDRM.
9D i s c u s s i o n
In this section we present the main results of our analysis that help to clarify some issues of
the discussion on the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).
First, the presence of the IMF has ambiguous eﬀects on the government’s welfare. While
an IMF bailout is a subsidy, it also might make countries worse oﬀ for removing the commit-
ment device to spend the amount borrowed in productive government expenditure, which
would cause them to avoid the distressful state all together.
Second, conﬂict between the IMF and the issuing government about collective action
provisions does not always arise. Both might prefer debt contracts without collective actions
for moral hazard considerations. On the other hand, both will prefer collective actions in
environments where J is small enough and the moral hazard issues are non-existent. That
is also the case when the IMF wishes to implement a full bailout regardless of the inclusion
of CACs in debt contracts (J is big enough).
Of course, conﬂict sometimes is evident. When both the IMF and lenders’ targeted ﬁscal
eﬀort levels are about the same, governments will deﬁnitely choose not to include CACs.
In this case, the IMF prefers that lenders forgive, but the country prefers an IMF bailout
to receive the subsidy. Because the IMF lacks commitment to avoid intervening, a SDRM
can induce lenders to internalize the default probability. This argument makes debt without
CACs an attractive proposition for governments, and a SDRM a desirable institution for the
IMF.
Third, it is worth noticing the theoretical possibility that collective actions can, in fact,
be utilized as a commitment device, opposite to common wisdom. This might happen in
environments where the targeted ﬁscal eﬀort of the IMF is higher than that of lenders.
In this case, if the government decides to include collective actions in debt contracts and
the IMF chooses not to implement a bailout, the equilibrium outcome would be one where
31lenders renegotiate and the ﬁscal eﬀo r te x e r t e db yt h eg o v e r n m e n ti st h a tt a r g e t e db yt h e
lenders. On the contrary, if the government opted for no friendly orderly restructuring
provisions, the IMF’s best response would be to implement a bailout. When moral hazard
problems are severe in that parameter range, the IMF intervention might end up reducing the
government’s expected utility. While it is counter intuitive to think that collective actions
might turn out to be a good idea precisely for moral hazard considerations, the logic behind
this idea is quite the same. Having no collective actions implies an IMF bailout and a higher
ﬁscal eﬀort, making the distress state not that bad. On the contrary, collective actions
would allow lenders to renegotiate and the IMF to stay out, making it ex-post worse but
introducing better incentives to stay out of trouble ex-ante.22 In this environment, forcing
debt contracts to include friendly orderly restructuring provisions would be a good idea from
both the IMF’s and the government’s standpoint.
Finally, our paper has a series of empirical implications. Eichengreen and Mody (2000)
conduct an empirical investigation to answer the question whether CACs raise borrowing
costs. Looking at primary debt markets (issuance), they ﬁnd that during the 1990s, East
Asian issuers paid lower spreads under UK law —which forces all debt contracts to include
CACs— while Latin American and Eastern European spreads were lower under US law —
which does not force friendly orderly restructuring provisions. These ﬁndings are conﬁrmed
by Eichengreen, Kletzer and Mody (2003) who work with data on secondary debt markets.
From their ﬁndings, they conjecture that for “less credit-worthy borrowers the advantage of
provisions facilitating an orderly restructuring are oﬀset by the moral hazard and additional
default risk associated with the presence of renegotiation-friendly loan provisions.”
Becker, Richards and Thaicharoen (2001) and Gugiatti and Richards (2003) argue that
bond prices are not aﬀected much by the implicit or explicit inclusion of these type of clauses
when we look at yields in secondary markets. From these results they conjecture that either
ﬁnancial markets are not really aware of the role of those clauses, which seems to be supported
by their conversations with practitioners, or the moral hazard problem that these clauses
22Eichengreen and Ruhl (2000) also point out that collective action clauses make it incentive compatible
for the IMF not to intervene.
32bring to international credit markets does not outweigh the ex-post ineﬃciencies (of no
renegotiation). Lead by this argument, they suggest that switching to a SDRM together
with a massive use of CACs would not increase borrowing costs.23
We rationalize this discussion with the help of the lenders’ participation constraint, from









eDl +( 1− e)S
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In the absence of IMF bailouts (S =0 ), the value of the debt at the renegotiation stage
(eDl) increases with CACs. If moral hazard is mild, then θ will change only marginally,
leading to a lower yield for debt issued with CACs. But if moral hazard is important, then
1−θ
θ will be higher under CACs. As long as the moral hazard dominates, CACs are not a
good idea. While we showed how this intuition works in Proposition 5, we also show that
the conjectures of the literature are incorrect, both when the IMF is present, and when there
are compositional eﬀects in sovereign debt markets.
Assume that the IMF has a big enough stake in the destiny of the country (J is big).
Anticipating the bailout, countries would issue debt without CACs or with enough free riding
among creditors (compositional eﬀect). The IMF would then launch a bailout if crisis occurs
given that it constitutes its best response. But a full bailout (S = Dh)i m p l i e se =1 ,
Dl = Dh and zero yield. The risk premium vanishes because lenders always collect, either
from the government or from the IMF. In this world with the IMF, looking at risk premia
in sovereign debt markets in search of evidence of moral hazard, like the empirical literature
does, is misleading. When a full bailout occurs along the equilibrium path, no yield premia
would be observed although the probability of crisis (the moral hazard) is at its maximum.
We also claim that the empirical exercises mentioned before might suﬀer from the Lucas
critique due to a compositional eﬀect in debt issuance. A large fraction of sovereign debt is
placed in jurisdictions not using friendly restructuring provisions, while the rest is divided
among many jurisdictions. The fact that incentives are aligned within a jurisdiction does
23Again, other contributions support this idea. See arguments presented in Haldane, Penalver and Saporta
(2003) and Dixon and Wall (2000).
33not imply that lenders would forgive in excess of what lenders in other jurisdictions would.
When the compositional eﬀects are present, CACs become an irrelevant dimension in debt
contracts since under ﬁnancial distress no debt would be condoned. It is for this reason
that yields in bonds with and without CACs are the same. We claim that this argument
invalidates the exercise of looking at yields in bonds with CACs in search for evidence of
moral hazard and, furthermore, predicting the consequences of a SDRM on the cost of
borrowing for sovereigns. The observed bond yields are equilibrium prices under the current
regime, characterized by no renegotiation regardless of the presence of CACs (not considered
in the empirical literature). Nonetheless, once a SDRM is put in place and debt contracts
are bound to include CACs, borrowing costs can increase drastically because of incentives.
Our approach suggests that before doing the previous empirical exercises we should in-
vestigate whether the inclusion of CACs necessarily implies renegotiation. If CACs do not
imply an easier renegotiation process in the ﬁrst place, then they could play no role on in-
centives. In this regard we suggest comparing yields in bonds issued by the same country
with and without CACs in a period of ﬁnancial distress, in other words, in periods before
renegotiation occurs and once the country is under ﬁnancial crisis (when risk premia go
up). Our model has clear predictions about these yields’ behavior. In the transition to a
ﬁnancially distressed state, yields on bonds with CACs should increase by more than those
without such clauses if renegotiation is indeed an equilibrium outcome of the game. The
reason is that the ﬁrst class of bondholders will condone a fraction of the debt while the rest
would not (or would condone less).
The data we examined suggest that CACs were an irrelevant dimension of debt contracts
for the case of Argentina 2001. First, note that the compositional eﬀect in the Argentinean
sovereign debt is heavily present. In the actual negotiation, about 46% of total debt is likely
to be excluded for one reason or the other. For example, loans from multilateral agencies,
which are non-renegotiable, account for 19% of the total debt.24
24Source: Ministry of Finance, Argentina.
34Figure 5: Debt composition. Argentina 2002.
The remaining 54% of the debt is distributed among 8 jurisdictions of which New York,
Germany and Japan, accounting for 70% of the renegotiable debt, have no CACs. This
compositional eﬀect is likely to lead UK lenders to avoid forgiving beyond what other juris-
dictions would condone, although CACs are included in their bonds.
Figure 6 shows the evolution of yields for two very similar Argentinean bonds issued under
UK law, with CACs, and German law, without them, during the period of ﬁnancial distress.25
Argentina fell into ﬁnancial distress in the second semester of 2001, once fundamentals were
weak and the US announced its position against IMF intervention, leading to an upward
spiral in bond yields.26
Note that these yields behave alike. Moreover, other bond yield comparisons for the case
of Argentina lead to the same result. Assuming that there are no big arbitrage opportunities
in bond markets, we conclude that CACs did not play an important role in the case of
Argentina. We argue that this is the case precisely because of the compositional eﬀects we
lay down in our model. CACs are not a relevant dimension of the contract since they are
25Both bonds are named “Letras Externas de la Republica Argentina”, and are denominated in Euros.
Both pay principal upon maturity (the one issued in Germany, in January 26 of 2007 while the one issued
in UK, in February 22 of 2007). Interests are paid annually (the German bond pays 10.25% and the UK one
10%). Source: JPMorgan.
26See the Wall Street Journal article titled: “O’Neil Suggests U.S Won’t Back More IMF Loans to Ar-
gentina,” October 31st 2001.
35not utilized along the equilibrium path.
Figure 6: Argentine yields comparison in 2001 crisis.
To conclude, we show that compositional eﬀects were also present in other experiences
of default. We present data on debt composition for Russia, Ukraine, Ecuador, Pakistan
and Argentina. The number of bonds issued by these sovereigns as well as the number of
j u r i s d i c t i o n si n v o l v e di sn o ta sb i ga sf o rt h e case of Argentina. Yet, we claim that the
compositional eﬀects are likely to have been present in those cases as well due to the high
fraction of oﬃcial debt, usually non-renegotiable. Note that in the case of Pakistan, for
example, 88% of the sovereign debt was non-renegotiable.
Table 1
While evidence suggest that CACs are unlikely to be a relevant characteristic in debt
contracts for these experiences, future research should be done to assert whether this is also
the case for most emerging countries and, furthermore, whether the presence of the IMF can
also help explain the observed lack of spread in bonds with and without CACs.
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39Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .
We start by deﬁning Problem V(-IC) as Problem V without the incentive compati-
bility constraint for G1:
max
Dh,G1
EU = θ(G1)[Yh − Dh]+[ 1− θ(G1)]












(Yl + S∗ − Dl)





















Note the following facts:
1. The utility of the government under Problem V(-IC) is increasing in S∗, since the
objective function is increasing in S∗ and the lender’s participation constraint relaxes
with S∗.
2. The utility of the government for a given value of S∗ under Problem V(-IC) is greater
than or equal to the one under Problem V, since Problem V has an additional
constraint (the incentive compatibility for G1).
3. When S∗ = Dh the solution of Problem V(-IC) satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
constraint. Hence the value of the utility of the government under Problem V(-IC)
equals the one under Problem V.
The proof follows from these three facts.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 .
40We prove our proposition by example, as we did for Proposition 5. Again we assume
θ(G1)=
½ ¯ θ G1 > G1
θ otherwise
(66)
where (¯ θ > θ).27 Another assumption is that Yl <D .
The incentive constraint to support a high level of productive government expenditure
under our assumption about θ(G1) is then
¡¯ θ − θ
¢
(Yh − Dh) ≥ kG1. (67)
The expected payoﬀ for a country issuing debt without collective action clauses and under
no bailout is
EU = ¯ θYh − D − kG1. (68)
Under partial bailout, if the country reaches the state of ﬁnancial distress the IMF will







. It is useful to inspect the
incentive compatibility constraint for this case. Because under partial bailout the state of the
world where the country faces ﬁnancial distress is not that bad, the government’s incentives
to allocate the funds in productive expenditure deteriorate. The incentive compatibility
constraint for a high level of G1 is


















 >k G1 (69)








(1+χ) is big enough to overturn Condition (67). Consequently,
the incentive compatibility constraint for ¯ θ does not hold and θ = θ.F u r t h e r m o r e ,G1 =0 .
Since Dl = Dh the investors’ participation constraint becomes




(Yl + S∗ − Dh)






27We work under the assumption that θ > 0. Otherwise loans for the amount of D could not be supported
in equilibrium.
41or similarly















Plugging this constraint into the objective function, we obtain the country’s expected utility
when the IMF is present
EU
IMF = θYh − θDh − (1 − θ)





































Now we are able to observe that contracts without CACs dominate those with them

































¡¯ θ − θ
¢
Yh − kG1. (74)
As in Proposition 5, the result depends on the sensitivity of the probability θ to produc-
tive government expenditure. If this probability is unaﬀected by G1 then the government
is better with partial bailout. Note that when
¯ ¯¯ θ − θ
¯ ¯ −→ 0 it is more unlikely that our
condition will hold. Why? Reducing the cost of the contract ex-post is optimal ex-ante.
Matters are diﬀerent when this sensitivity is strong. Making the state of distress very
bad (although ex-post ineﬃcient) will provide greater incentives for countries to stay out of
trouble and to maintain ﬁscal conduct. This is the case when, other things equal,
¯ ¯¯ θ − θ
¯ ¯ is
bigger.
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